Introduction
This is an essay on the organization and experi encing of emotion in everyday life. It draws upon Cooley's (1912) assertion that self-feelings, or self-sentiments, are basic to the sociological view of primary human nature. I will contend that sociologists of a symbolic interactionist ori entation have done little to forward the study of the emotions. The working framework that I will set forth draws heavily from William James and the German and French phenomenologists, including Brentano, Husserl, Scheler, Schutz, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty. A central point of my argument shall propose that the emotions lie at the core of the intersection of mind, culture, and society. All cultures control and modulate mental states and make legal and/or moral distinc tions between logical and illogical, rational and na tional mental conditions and behavioral acts. A phenomenology of emotion involves a reconsid eration of deviance and deviant conduct within an interpretive framework. These are my inten tions.
These words describe the humanness of the hu man conditions and lie at the core of sociologi cal human nature. Humans experience their hu manness in the presence of other humans and we may propose the following proposition:
The way persons act is very much determined by the moods1, emotions2, and feelings they bring into and experience in their interpersonal situations o f social interaction. By the emotions I am referring to the ways in which persons en ter into the organization of their own and oth ers' on-going activity, including, as Cooley not ed, through the sentiments of "love, resentiment, ambition, vanity, hero-worship, and the feeling of right and wrong" (Cooley 1912: 28) .
The Interactionist Tradition and the Neglected Emotions
Symbolic interactionists have not contributed to the study of emotions. This is because their study of subjective, human group life has pro ceeded from the following proposition: 'The way persons act is very much determined by how they define the situations they find them selves m " (Thomas/Thomas 1928: 571) . This proposition, which assumes wide-awake, cogni tively self-reflexive individuals, has produced a host of case studies and ethnographies on the definitions of situations constructed by medical 1 Mood is here defined as an inferred, internal mental state o f the person which references their feelings in the situation. It is given off through their personal announcements, their gestures, and their states of appearance. Persons can be said, for instance, to be in serious moods, bad moods, good moods, sad moods, or sulking moods. 2 Emotions are defined as thoughts about feelings.
They are experienced in the person's phenomenolo gical stream of consciousness and displayed in the interactional stream or situation. An elaboration of these two points will appear later in the paper.
students, jazz musicians, dying persons, milkmen, school teachers, mental patients, Polish immi grants, Italian youth, street-corner Blacks and used car salesmen (see Lofland 1976 , for a thor ough review of this large body of research).
This proposition points to a fundamental bias in interactionist research which may be termed the "overly reflexive" or "overly cognitive" view of man. It can be traced, perhaps, to G.H. Mead's model of the act and his treatment of the "I" and "me" in interaction which was decidedly cognitive and was critical of efforts, such as those of James, Cooley, and Freud, to incorporate emotions into man (1934: 173, 211, 224, 255 Icheiser [1970] represent early and significant efforts to introduce this line of thought into American sociology.) Garfinkel (1967) , Lyman and Scott (1970) , Lyman (1978) and Cicourel (1972) A re-interpretation of Goffman's work suggests that it is "structuralist" or "structural" in na ture, and that it has little place for selves and feelings (see Gonos 1977 , Denzin/Keller 1980 .
Meaning, motive and intent are reduced to the content of frames, divorced from persons. Re gularities in social activity are determined by an abstract set of rules which are embedded at a deep level in the codes, syntax and grammar of language and ritual. Everyday behaviors are surface displays of these rules. For Goffman, behaviors, encounters, strips and performances are to be analyzed as structural totalities or as forms. Like an ethological structuralist who does taxonomies, Goffman offers a system of binary opposites which are based on "perceived differences" between objects and acts. Illustra tions include a play and its rehearsal, playfulness and fighting, real and unreal, sane and insane, stigmatized and normal, real and copy, benign and exploitive hoaxes. Structural configurations, strips, are transformed, redefined as different. "This is not a fight, it is play" . Goffman seeks the rules of transformation that give everyday life its sense of continuity. Emotion, affect and mood, in Goffman's world, are unimportant elements of " framed" activity. It is necessary, therefore, to turn elsewhere for the study of emotion and its place in the interactional stream.
Locating Emotion
It is convenient to begin with William James, who based a considerable portion of his psycho logy on a treatment of the emotions (James 1890, vols. I and II; see also Sartre 1939) . Ja mes (1890: 224) asserts that:
The only thing which psychology has a right to postu late at the outset is the fact o f thinking itself . . . The universal conscious fact is . . . T think' and T feel' (1890: 226).
With slight modification, the symbolic interactionist can rewrite James as follows:
The only thing which sociology has a right to postulate at the outset is the fact of interaction itself. Along this same line, the emotional attitude is often articulated through the kinesics of body discourse, including smiles, shrugs, hung heads, and slumped shoulders. The emotional attitude is non-verbally conveyed, perhaps because the person lacks the appropriate vocabulary, image ry, or set of reflections that would correctly convey their current feelings. Indeed, the repeat ed non-verbal expressions of emotion may con stitute the empirical base against which verbal announcements of mood and feeling are made. The body works both ways. It validates, em bodies emotional experiences while communicat ing emotional definitions. The self is behind all of this as subject.
Emotions connect minds and bodies, and while they must be seen as arising out of the inter preted interactional situation, they can also be viewed as flowing out of social situations that are structured at a higher level. Ritual emotion as seen in church sacraments is one illustration of this point. The ressentiment that Max Scheler attributed to bourgeoisie Germany in 1910 was located in the changing industrial cir cumstances of the time.
The natural language terms which describe the emotions frequently present them in pairs which describe parallel mental and physical states. In stances would include crying and feeling sad, happiness and laughter, fleeing and terror. How ever, many emotions are not necessarilty paired with exclusive, specific bodily states, including shame, guilt, love, boredom, and the feeling of being drained. The everyday language of emo tion is one filled with gloss terms that are part of the word game that surrounds these mental states. Emotions have taken-for-granted essenses, familiar zones of recognition, sensed and shared body and mental states. These presumed es sences are only partially captured by such words as fear, anger, fright, horror, joy, love, and envy.
No emotion, like no thought, is ever re-experi enced in exactly the same way. Thus, while the words stay the same, the experiences do not. A purely phenomenological analysis of emotion and mood will never discover through reduction and bracketing the essence or pure form of any given emotion. As James (1890: 454) Freud's real and false emotions, Sartre's strong, weak and spurious emotions and James's coarse and subtle emotions pertain, not to discoverable elements in a given emotion, but rather refer to the type of consciousness that surrounds or em bodies the emotional experience. These terms are on the fringe of the relationship between consciousness and experience.
Accordingly, it can be argued that emotions are experienced in relationship to an object and an activity. The object may be our consciousness and the activity is our thinking about our feel ings at the moment. The object may be another individual and the activity may be our inter actions with that person.
Like Becker's (1973) marihuana smoker, persons have to learn to identify their emotions; they also have to learn how to interpret and act to wards these elements in their streams of con sciousness. They learn how to control them, when to call them out, when not to act on them. Multiple meanings are attached to them as the person defines them in different ways at different points in time.
Finally, it must be seen that emotional defini tions revolve directly around defintions of the self in the social situation. Emotion flows from self-other comparisons. These definitions often represent tips or parts of broader and larger de finitions of self. Ressentiment, for example, ap pears to consist of feelings of revenge, envy, spite, malice, and jealousy. Thus, the emotion of the self at the moment may be only part of a larger relational picture or stream of conscious ness. Accordingly, the thought the person is pre sently involved in is thought that could be about any prior thought which, however, may not be directly accessible in the person's stream of con sciousness at the moment. But one can turn back on one's thoughts and make accessible for gotten or currently irrelevant experiences. The stream moves backward as well as forward.
Toward a Theory of Mood, Affect, and Emo tion
Everyday life is organized around a body of taken-for-granted assumptions concerning pri mary human nature, by which (to repeat) is meant those human sentiments that reference, for instance, fear, hope, love, envy, pride, hu mility, shame, awe, love, and hate. These as sumptions will be termed the actor's primary interpretive framework. This framework em bodies the person's conception of a normal, everyday interactant, including himself. The primary interpretative framework provides the person with a scheme for classifying fellow in teractants into a variety of categories, including gender and gender identity, relational bonded ness, and work history. Persons are assumed to be carrying a moving biography when they pass through their daily rounds, and as they are glimpsed by others, it is also assumed that they have been schooled on such matters as affect, mood control, tact, ritual, the sacred, and the civil (Shils 1976) . This schooling has presumably been accomplished as a matter of course in the guided and unguided doings of everyday life. Actors assume that when they approach other actors that those persons will be in some "moodstate" or emotional frame and that the "moodstate" will complement or disrupt the ongoing cognitive tone of their interaction. As Stone (1962: 97) remarks: "that 'Joe' or 'Jane' is mad or sad will have definite consequences for the talk with 'Jim' or 'Joan'." Still, normal persons are assumed to be in the possession of a body of interpersonal experiences which will influence and constrain the moods they bring into their interactions. Moods, emotions, and their manage ment are basic elements in the person's primary interpretive framework.
The Interactive Situation The second stream is interactional and public and is observable in the communicative acts of each individual and, most importantly, in their joint act. Here the public, objectified self is observed. The private, phenomenological self intrudes into the public life of the joint act through the giving off of information concerning one's mood and one's emotional reaction to the actions of the other as well as one's reactions to his own activity. In Cooley's words (1902: 184) , "we imagine how we appear to the other, we imagine their judgement of that appearance and we experience a sense of self-feeling, such as pride or shame or mortification."
The phenomenological stream thus builds upon Mead's (1934) model of the "I" and the "me" , and Kurt Riezler's (1950: 111) "I, you, we, thing, and world" paradigm. Actor A designates and interprets certain actions of B as being B's interpretations of A's ongoing line of action. A incorporates B's imagined responses into his phe nomenological stream as a "me" and conjointly as an "I" A interprets B's behavior. This inter pretation arises as an "I" in A's thought and enters B's thoughts as a "me" . Figure One de picts this process as two subjects. A and B, con front and interact with one another.
( 12)
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Interactional Stream Numbers 1-12 suggest the temporal flow of inter action, starting with A's first act towards B.
Persons enter interactive situations as individuals involved in on-going plans of action or projects. They are differentially wide-awake, or reflexive about these plans, for the situation may be high ly routine, or previously defined as problematic. They bring, as Schutz (1962) states, a stock of knowledge about the situation that is partially shaped by their prior biographical experiences in it. They arrive, so to speak, with a purpose at hand and with a set o f motives which, if imple mented, will permit them to act in ways that will order the behaviors of those they confront in the situation. These motives are of the "inorder-to" and "because" variety; they are pros pective and retrospective. The person's prior relationship to the situation also structures what they will take to be relevant as interaction un folds, and they work within a scheme o f rele vancies that is altered as interaction is under taken. Persons also utilize a tacit set o f typifications which may predefine the situation as gen eral, categorical or specific.
The motives, purposes-at-hand, scheme o f rele vancies, and set o f typifications that persons bring into situations are taken-for-granted, yet challenged over and over again as the situation becomes emergent and problematic and emotion al.
In their joint acts persons appear as interactive selves, with distinct biographies. As persons en ter the joint act they announce themselves, mak ing a claim for a particular identity and particu-lar purpose in the situation (Stone 1962 Moods and emotions are often misperceived by others. That is, persons may be "out of aware ness" of one another's moods, and they may never learn the other's mood at the time of a particular interaction (Stone 1977) . This same lack of sensibility may occur within the person. One may misperceive one's own mood, or one may later reinterpret the same mood to be dif ferent than originally understood. A lack of reflexivity may prevent a person from ever under standing a particular mood, or a want of des criptive terminology may seriously impair one's ability to reflect upon one's own moods. At such times, semi-private terminology may be used to refer to these moods, such as "valley of the doldrums" , "the Walt Disneys" , or "the tired laughies." Colors are often used to refer to partially understood moods, such as "blue" or "black" Mondays, Tuesdays, etc., or red moods or green moods, or in the words of an old song, "lavender blue moods" . (These moods may, of course, be quite well perceived, and the odd terminology used as a private short hand). A friend of mine refers now to uplifted, optimistic moods as "the Rocky's" , after the movie. As a correllary, terminology may act ually hinder perception of a mood by another or by self. Overly-intellectualized jargon may be so devoid of emotional content that the affective component of the mood may be lost. While occasionally useful in that such distancing in sulates the person from the emotion, over-intellectualizing and hence, over-distancing, may al low the person to simply deny the emotional content of the mood (i.e., just a bad day).
Two Types o f Joint Activity
Distorted emotions and emotional performances, such as temter tantrums or loud, quarrelsome arguments, suggest two forms of joint activity or interaction. An individual may interact with another or interact at another. Interacting-withanother represents a joint act which evolves and emerges on the basis of a give-and-take between the actions of two persons. Their behaviors join, merge, build and grow upon one another. A takes B's last comment into account when for mulating the next statement he will make. Such interaction builds in a polythetic manner.
Interacting-at-another, when in an intense emo tional frame, involves a joint act that builds largely in terms of A's or B's actions, feelings, and intentions, and not in terms of a merger of A and B. A treats B as a member of an audience towards whom a performance can be directed. This is emotion at a glance, mono the tic under standing and action. Emotional performances of anger, hostility, revenge, wrath, and hatred (and sometimes love) involve actors interacting at, not with, one another. Actor B, in this situation, may of course attempt to follow A's perform ance in a step-by-step fashion, hoping to under stand it, or stop or check it. A's success is con tingent on not permitting B to stop the perform ance and reinterpret it from a polythetic frame.
Phenomenology and Selves
Following Mead (1934) and Blumer (1937; 1969) , the self of the individual refers to the self-reflective, self-objectified definitions or attitudes he holds toward himself as a distinct social object. These definitions and their mean ings arise out of the interactions the person has with fellow individuals. They involve the person turning back on himself and seeing him self from others' perspectives and points of view. The self-ideas, self-pictures and self-im ages the person holds give rise to multiple im ages and multiple identifications of one's self as a unique social object (Strauss 1959) . These images revolve around repeated glimpses the person has of himself (Goffman 1976) . These glimpses become molded into recurring self ideas and recurring self-identities that achieve a sense of semi-permanancy in the person's phenomenological stream of consciousness. These embodied images, like obdurate objects in a flowing stream, constitute the pegs of the self that the person constantly returns to as he day dreams, plans, fantasizes, and more generally evaluates himself. They become routinized, yet ritualized, self-ideas, and persons carry these self ideas from situation to situation. Moods, emo tions, and feelings are attached to these ritualized self-ideas, making mood and affect central to the study of the self in social interaction.
The Social Organization and Expression of Mood and Emotion
Mood, which references the inferences inter actants make about one another's feelings in a social situation, is modulated or organized in everyday life around two taken-for-granted assumptions. The first is termed the illusion o f the mood-neutral self Or, as Stone (1977: 6) states, "we express a mood somewhere in the middle range tending slightly toward euphoria." Past (or current) moods which would contradict the tone and purposes of the interaction at hand are expected to be suspended. The pains, illnesses, tragedies, fatigues, and deprivations the person brings into situations are expected to be suspended once interaction begins. Actors, then, are constrained to control, neutralize, and modulate contrary moods. Second, and as a correllary, moods are assumed to be situation spe cific; actors must fit their moods to the mood of the situated joint action. Failing to do so, they must have an account for their mood un doing. Here they are obliged to bring portions of their current biography into the situation. These two assumptions permit the following ob servations. Mood and emotion are infectious. Like embarrassment (Gross/Stone 1964) , they spread through situations, both outwardly and inwardly. Feelings enter each interactant's stream of consciousness and become part of their reflected appraisals of the other (and of themselves). Mood is fragile; it can break down at any point in a joint action, as when contra dictory moods compete for attention in a situa tion. Persons can move from grief to laughter, from seriousness to humor. Some moods are obligatory, as the mood tone of funerals, wed dings, and coronations reveal; and on occasion persons are constrained to adopt moods which contradict their personal definitions of the situa tion. This produces alienations from interaction, fabrications and deceptions (see Goffman 1974) .
When moods cannot be controlled or suspended, actors appear to have at least two strategies at their disposal. They can make remedial moves which correct their inappropirate mood, typical ly utilizing an apology (Lyman/Scott 1968) . Or they can move to suspend the official mood of the occasion and make collaborative moves to collectively join in the "illegal" mood. Here ac tors may put serious intentions aside and joint ly move into an altered state of consciousness. For instance, the grief that grips participants aft er funerals and draws each of them into private moods may be altered by drinking bouts. This may even be ritualized, as in the pattern observ ed in Irish wakes.
The experiencing of moods is contingent on re lational and situational contexts. If intimate relations are compared to civil relations and if situations are classified as private and public, a four-celled structure is produced. At least two propositions are suggested. The more private the situation and the more intimate the relation ship, the greater the co-involvement between the interactants and the greater the effect of one person's mood upon the other. Mood-shar ing is greatest in these situations. However, mass gatherings, witnessed in political rallies and the situations of spectator sports, will also reveal large numbers of persons sharing in the same mood. Through their interactions participants generate a "superficially" in-common public mood. The theater offers a variation on this pat tern. In the audience-performer relationship, the performer is expected to manipulate, modulate, and alter the audience's mood. This is one rea son persons attend public performances.
Mood-Joining
Mood-joining describes the process by which two or more persons fit their moods together into a common feeling-state; they interact with one another. To accomplish such a state, they will be led to participate in a joint activity that will facilitate the production of a common mood. They share and perhaps take turns doing this activity. Together, they may eat a ritual meal and in that act produce a state of sociabili ty (see Simmel 1950) . They may take turns tell ing stories about themselves or the other. They may play a board game (Goffman 1961) and produce a state of euphoria. They may take turns doing a physical act, or they may tell jokes while they do a common act, such as nailing shingles on the roof of a house. Too, they may ritualistically partake in the ingestion of a mood-altering substance, although the ex pected euphoric effects of the substance may be repressed lest the interactants get too carried away (see Updike 1964) in their altered mood states.
Moods, however, are seldom fully shared. Per sons proceed through their moods at different rates and at different depths. If they are taking turns, as in storytelling, one party to the inter action is obliged to be a serious listener, while the other (the talker) is obliged to tell a "tell ing" story. Hence, persons may alternate in their expression and experiencing of a common mood. When their joint action comes to conclusion and as they later tell stories about it, they may gloss their so-called common mood into a recon structed story that tells of both of them having had a good time at the same time, while it would be closer to say that they had a good time at alternate times.
If individuals are successful in constructing a shared mood which they define as favorable, they will attempt to repeat that experience or even ritualize it. They may come together again on the anniversary of their shared mood and attempt to replicate the sequence of events they remember themselves sharing together. Persons are led to align themselves with persons who will produce and share with them moods that they take to be central to their sacred or ritual selves.
Moods and Selves
Selves, as obdurate and fragmentary images per sons have of themselves, are attached to moods, and these moods are attached to the public and private histories persons have of and with them selves. Persons anchor their selves to recurring mood states, and they speak of foolish selves, in timate selves, happy selves, and sad selves. Ritual or anchored selves are attached to idealized mood, to remembered moods of the person and their interactive others. They reconstruct them selves as happy or sad persons, and they bracket large (and small) sequences in their biographies around these reconstructions. They may speak, for instance, of particularly difficult or trying times in their lives. Present selves are often com pared to these bracketed periods in the person's biography.
Mood, Selves, and Others
Moods arise out of real and imagined interac tions with others. The others with whom one interacts stand in some intimate, civil, or an chored relationship to the person (Goffman 1971; Stone 1962) . Classes of others involke re curring moods for the person, including feelings of love, friendliness, anger and hostility (see Shils 1975) . These moods differentially enter into the person's joint actions with those others, and contradictory moods are often generated. Lovers fight, and bitter enemies tell jokes over ritual meals. Intimacy, in particular, often gener ates ambivalent and emotionally opposite mood states.
Social relationships become mood-grounded pro ductions that are marked by "mood outbursts" . And often, the interactants will go through long periods of time when they are "out of mood" with one another. However, persons attempt to stabilize their phenomenological, interactional and relational worlds so that their moods and their selves remain in balance and under control. They develop mood dependencies and mood ad dictions. They become dependent upont the other to assist them in the creation of particular moods -out of which flow valued, ritual selves. These dependencies become exaggerated and are built out of proportion. Often disillusionment sets in and persons be come alienated from the moods, selves and others they have attached themselves to. These alienations enter into the person's on-going net work of joint actions. They may produce, as Lemert (1962) and Goffman (1972) have noted, relational relocations.
Still, to the extent to which individuals are in volved in common joint actions, they will be led to share moods with one another that flow from the private spheres of their lives. This sharing may draw them more closely together in the public sphere.
The recurring moods or emotions of the per son come out of this relational context of selfand other-alignments. Blumer (1952: 599) 
Illegal Moods and Social Structure
The bad moods of a child, seen in temper tan trums, are not illegal; the child-abusing activi ties of an outraged parent are, however. The drunken driver and the person who hallucinates and runs naked through the streets of a small town are also in the state of an illegal mood.
Here we can see how a society and its laws en ter directly into the organization and experi encing of everyday phenomenological life. Ac tors are expected to keep their moods and their behaviors under control and within the legal boundaries sanctioned by society. The ablebodied person, in American society at least, is one who is in full control of his faculties, his moods, and his behaviors. He is a person who embodies the social order's core conceptions of cheerfulness, self-control, and interactional competency (see Shils 1975) . These moods are expressions of the primary interpretative frame work. In everyday life the mood that one estab lishes can be as basic to the organization of one's joint actions as are one's claims to power, status, and social influence. The illegality of some moods can lead to "se cret deviance" .
Actors attach a sense of moral worth to their emotional feelings, believing that their real or true selves reside in particular emotional ex periences. Hence, what the actor takes to be central in everyday life may, in fact, place him outside society's moral boundaries. Every per son, then, is a deviant, at least in those moments when they practice their cherished emotional states. Culture, mind, and mood thus interpene trate. The deviant thought rests behind the ac tor's cherished self.
Notes on Method
Moods point to the private and public sides of persons. Moods are interactional productions. Regularities in their organization and expression have been suggested. Methodologically, investiga tors need to develop techniques that permit the careful recording of joint actions in natural sit uations (see Denzin 1977) . Conversations, as joint acts, need to be carefully studied, not as turn-taking activities, but as self-guided produc tions. Joint acts with long careers need to be studied. Interpersonal relationships with long hi stories of shared moods are worthy of research.
Recurring mood offenders, including children and disorderly adults, need to be investigated for what they tell about inappropriate mood (see Scheff 1977: 487) . The techniques for pro cessing mood offenders also need to be examin ed.
Symbolic interactionists need to develop skills in interviewing persons concerning the private, covert organization of their phenomenological streams of consciousness. Transcripts of public conversations can be presented to individuals, and they can be queried about their thoughts and moods during the conversation (see Ramos, 1978 , for one illustration of this technique). Careful study of stream of consciousness novels is also called for (see Finkelstein 1979) . The literary techniques for communicating mood and emotion need to be understood.
Daydreams deserve special attention. As recur ring conversations of the person, they often re volve around attempts to catch valued moods. Their study should extend our understanding of selves and everyday social interaction. Finally, the emotions of fear, anger, rage, disgust and hatred should be investigated and compared with such everyday states as boredom, nervous ness, pride, self-satisfaction and envy.
Models of man which stress only the rational and cognitive foundation of action are no longer sufficient. A social psychology of emotion and feeling is clearly called for. Indeed, the full range of human symbolic activities needs to be more fully addressed by the symbolic interactionist.
Moods and emotions are basic to the conversa tions persons carry on with themselves as they join their activities with others. A social psy chology which claims to study the subjective side of social life can no longer afford to ignore the affective, emotional and mood-shaped com ponents of this process. As society reaches out and enters into the person, as seen in joint ac tivities, alterations in the phenomenological stream of consciousness can be seen. Persons are connected to society in part through the moods they experience. And herein lies the sig nificance of mood for the study of society and social organization.
